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I. INTRODUCTION 
Donald De La Haye, former kicker for the University of Central Florida 
(UCF) football team, ran a popular video channel on the website YouTube, 
garnering more than 50,000 subscribers by detailing his life as a college athlete.1 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, Class of 2021. I 
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In 2017, the UCF Office of Compliance informed him that in order to comply 
with National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) restrictions, he must 
either delete or demonetize his YouTube channel.2 He would not be allowed to 
continue using his name or likeness in future videos if he continued to profit off 
the channel, due to NCAA rules against athletes profiting from the use of their 
own likeness.3 Ultimately, De La Haye decided to continue making videos for 
his channel, 4 and, as of November 2020, his channel had more than 3 million 
subscribers.5 As a result, UCF pulled his athletic scholarship and NCAA 
eligibility.6 In response, he filed suit against UCF alleging violations of his First 
and Fourteenth Amendment rights.7 After an eight month legal battle, UCF 
settled the case, allowing him to continue both his schoolwork and video 
channel, but his promising athletic career was forever forfeited.8 
The NCAA is an intercollegiate sports governing body that has regulated 
college athletic activities for over a century and currently prohibits collegiate 
athletes at participating schools from profiting off the use of their name, image, 
or likeness (NILs).9 On September 30, 2019, California lawmakers thrust the 
issue of compensation for college athletes into the national spotlight when 
Governor Gavin Newsom signed into law the Fair Pay to Play Act.10 The law 
specifically maintains the prohibition on colleges, universities, conferences, and 
 
 1 Richard Johnson, UCF Says Its Kicker Can’t Make Money Off of YouTube Videos 
Because … NCAA, SB NATION (June 16, 2017), https://www.sbnation.com/college-
football/2017/6/12/15785390/ucf-kicker-youtube-donald-de-la-haye. In interviews, De La 
Haye has stated that his video production is an extension of his marketing studies and has 
been his passion since he was young. Id. 
 2 Steven Ruiz, A College Football Player Has a Hit YouTube Channel. He Might Have 
to Give It Up to Remain Eligible, FORTHEWIN (June 12, 2017), 
https://ftw.usatoday.com/2017/06/donald-de-la-haye-youtube-channel-central-florida-ucf-
ncaa [https://perma.cc/5SLX-59EJ] (“De La Haye’s most popular videos are shot at UCF 
facilities but really have nothing to do with the football team and do not use the school’s 
name or logo in order to promote the videos.”). 
 3 Id. 
 4 Alex Kirshner, He Lost a Scholarship Because of YouTube Ads, So He’s Taking 
NCAA Rules to Court, SB NATION (July 14, 2018), https://www.sbnation.com/college-
football/2018/7/13/17565672/donald-de-la-haye-youtube-ncaa-deestroying. 
 5 Deestroying, YOUTUBE, 
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC4mLlRa_dezwvytudo9s1sw [https://perma.cc/3LXS-
M2DR]. 
 6 Kirshner, supra note 4. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Robert Henneke & Jon Riches, Attorneys: UCF’s De La Haye Settles for a Bright 
Future Off the Field, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Nov. 16, 2018), 
https://www.orlandosentinel.com/opinion/os-op-ucf-kicker-de-la-haye-success-story-
20181116-story.html. 
 9 History, NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION (Nov. 8, 2010), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20110807060521/http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/publ
ic/ncaa/about%2Bthe%2Bncaa/who%2Bwe%2Bare/about%2Bthe%2Bncaa%2Bhistory. 
 10 S.B. 206, Collegiate Athletics: Student Athlete Compensation and Representation, 
383 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019). 
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the NCAA itself paying players for the use of their NILs, but allows players to 
enter into deals with companies and third parties for the use of their NILs.11 
NCAA officials quickly opposed the legislation, stating that it would effectively 
eliminate the distinction between college and professional sports, and released 
statements claiming the law is unconstitutional.12 However, less than two 
months later, in response to the pressure created by the act and other states 
introducing similar legislation, the NCAA announced it will amend its rules to 
allow college athletes to be compensated for the use of their NILs.13 
Many sportswriters and legal experts have been skeptical about the NCAA’s 
motivations behind this announcement, claiming that the NCAA is attempting 
to stall the momentum of federal and state governments introducing protections 
for athletes.14 Under this theory, the NCAA plans to buy time for the public 
concern to settle and then pass minimal reforms themselves. 
This article will explain the backdrop of the college sports industry, its large 
market, and the recent turn of events which have led to conflict between the 
NCAA and the state of California. After analyzing the merits of each side’s 
arguments, this article reasons that a federal court would most likely side with 
the NCAA and strike down the California law under the Dormant Commerce 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The article concludes by proposing a federal 
law similar to California’s as an ultimate solution. 
II. BACKGROUND: THE NCAA, BIG MONEY, AND CALIFORNIA’S FAIR 
PAY TO PLAY ACT 
The evolving nature of modern college sports has thrust NCAA player 
compensation restrictions into the national spotlight in ways that were likely 
never contemplated when the rules were first passed. As the market for college 
sports expands, the exploitation of college athletes increases, since they provide 
the product but are prohibited from utilizing their successes or independently 
marketing themselves.  
 
 11 See infra Part II.C. 
 12 NCAA Responds to California Senate Bill 206, NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC 
ASSOCIATION (Sept. 11, 2019), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-
center/news/ncaa-responds-california-senate-bill-206 [https://perma.cc/57JP-RY6D]; Chris 
Bumbaca and Steve Berkowitz, NCAA Sends California Governor Letter Calling Name, 
Likeness Bill ‘Unconstitutional’, USA TODAY (Sept. 11, 2019), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2019/09/11/ncaa-sends-letter-calling-
california-likeness-bill-unconstitutional/2284789001/ [https://perma.cc/9CWC-B2W8]. 
 13 Steve Almasy et al., NCAA Says Athletes May Profit from Name, Image and Likeness, 
CNN (Oct. 29, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/29/us/ncaa-athletes-
compensation/index.html [https://perma.cc/8M8H-XKL5]. 
 14 See infra Part II.C. 
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A. History of NCAA Restrictions and Where They Currently Stand 
The NCAA was formed in the early 1900’s in response to dangerous 
conditions in football that had led some universities to discontinue the sport 
entirely.15 After World War II, the NCAA passed the “Sanity Code,” barring 
any form of merit pay to athletes, including scholarships or cost of living 
expenses.16 The NCAA based these restrictions on its designation of college 
athletic participants as “student-athletes,” a term which it successfully used for 
many years to avoid liability and accountability to athletes in worker’s 
compensation and similar lawsuits for damages resulting from NCAA 
restrictions.17 
In the decades following, the NCAA made several changes to this policy, 
fighting against any compensation for student-athletes, while only allowing 
progress in this area when forced by courts in antitrust lawsuits.18  
A recent and pivotal case in this line of antitrust challenges to NCAA 
restrictions was O’Bannon v. NCAA in 2015.19 There, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that NCAA member schools may award 
monetary grants to student-athletes up to the full cost of attendance at the school, 
including tuition, cost of living, and small stipends to cover expenses.20  
 
 15 History, supra note 9. 
 16 Andy Schwarz, The NCAA Has Always Paid Players; Now It’s Just Harder to 
Pretend They Don’t, DEADSPIN (Aug. 29, 2015), https://deadspin.com/the-ncaa-has-always-
paid-players-now-its-just-harder-t-1727419062. 
 17 For example, Kent Waldrep was a running back at Texas Christian University who 
was paralyzed in a football game in 1974. “Student Athletes” - Okay, but What Happens 
When Things Go Wrong?, FROGS O’ WAR (Aug. 22, 2014), 
https://www.frogsowar.com/2014/8/22/5922603/student-athletes-okay-but-what-happens-
when-things-go-wrong. In 2000, a Texas Court of Appeals overturned his successful 
worker’s compensation claim, stating that he was not an employee, but a “student-athlete,” 
and in doing so, the court cited the definition of “student-athlete” from the NCAA bylaws: 
“one who engaged in athletics for the education, physical, mental, and social benefits he 
derives therefrom, and to whom athletics is an avocation.” Waldrep v. Tex. Emp’rs. Ins. 
Assoc., 21 S.W.3d 692 (Tex. App. 2000). 
 18 For an in-depth history of the NCAA’s campaign against student-athlete 
compensation and the court cases that slowly forced their hand, see Rodney K. Smith, A 
Brief History of the National Collegiate Athletic Association’s Role in Regulating 
Intercollegiate Athletics, 11 MARQ. SPORTS. L. REV. 9, 13–21 (2000). 
 19 O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 20 Id. at 1074–76. The federal Court of Appeals held the NCAA’s player compensation 
rules were subject to federal antitrust legislation and the plaintiffs in the case (current and 
former college athletes) had suffered a justiciable injury as a result of the NCAA’s 
compensation restrictions. Id. at 1053. Furthermore, the opinion stated that courts will not 
find the NCAA’s player compensation rules presumptively valid but will instead subject 
them to a “Rule of Reason” analysis. Id. 
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B. College Sports Have Grown into a Multi-Billion-Dollar Per Year 
Industry 
The juggernaut market of college sports is continuing to grow with no 
indication of slowing down anytime soon. Sports revenue for the schools that 
comprise the five largest college athletic conferences (SEC, Big Ten, ACC, Big 
12, and Pac-12) increased from $570 million in 2005 to more than $2 billion in 
2015, a 266% increase over just 10 years.21 These same schools in 2015 paid 
their cumulative 530 football coaches $405 million in salaries and benefits, 
while spending just $179.8 million on scholarships and cost of living expenses 
for their 4,979 football players.22 
Due to the large economic market surrounding college sports, a 
correspondingly large market exists for college athletes’ NIL use. One expert 
predicted that Clemson’s star quarterback Trevor Lawrence could have made $1 
million during the 2019 football season from endorsement deals alone.23 The 
same expert also predicted that Duke’s Zion Williamson could have made $2.5 
million in his single year of college basketball.24 However, experts predict that 
only a small percentage of athletes—around 5%—could enter into meaningful 
deals at major universities.25  
Star athletes at smaller colleges and universities may still be able to land 
sponsorship deals with local businesses. Sports marketing authorities have 
predicted that local businesses will be eager to tap student-athletes who connect 
with fans.26 One expert believes these local players may garner regional 
advertising deals ranging from $10,000 to $25,000 due to local media coverage 
and alumni networks.27 
 
 21 Conference Revenues 2015, KNIGHT COMMISSION ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS 
(2016) https://www.knightcommission.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/2015-
conferencerevenues.pdf [https://perma.cc/M7VE-FMDF]. 
 22 Jon Solomon, The History Behind the Debate Over Paying NCAA Athletes, THE 
ASPEN INSTITUTE (Apr. 23, 2018), https://www.aspeninstitute.org/blog-posts/history-
behind-debate-paying-ncaa-athletes/ [https://perma.cc/6VSU-FUUK].  
 23 Mark Emmert, If College Athletes Could Profit Off Their Marketability, How Much 
Would They Be Worth? In Some Cases, Millions, USA TODAY (Oct. 9, 2019), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2019/10/09/college-athletes-with-name-
image-likeness-control-could-make-millions/3909807002/ [https://perma.cc/5CE2-8AP9] 
(statement of Tye Gonser, a lawyer who formerly worked for a private agency handling 
endorsement deals for professional athletes).  
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Khristopher J. Brooks, NCAA Athletes Getting Paid: Thousands Could Be in Their 
Futures, CBS NEWS (Nov. 1, 2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ncaa-athletes-getting-
paid-thousands-could-be-in-their-future/ [https://perma.cc/4TV4-WV72] (statement of 
sports marketing and branding expert Tim Derdenger). 
 27 Emmert, supra note 23 (statement of University of Southern professor David Carter, 
principal owner of the Sports Business Group). 
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Non-superstars could also make thousands from licensing fees if they could 
profit from NIL use. In 2013, former college athletes sued the NCAA and EA 
Sports, the publisher of NCAA sports video games, seeking a cut of the money 
that was made from the portrayal of their NILs in the video games.28 The 
plaintiffs hired Dan Rascher, a sport management professor, to estimate how 
much money college football players could potentially make from the video 
game through a collective bargaining agreement.29 For an NCAA football video 
game, a conservative estimate would be $1,000–1,500 per year for each player 
depicted.30 
C. The California Fair Pay to Play Act 
On September 30, 2019, California lawmakers sparked a national debate 
when Governor Newsom signed into law Senate Bill 206, the Fair Pay to Play 
Act.31 Effective 2023, the Act will give all athletes at California colleges and 
universities the right to profit from the use of their NILs.32 Specifically, the law 
bars colleges and universities, collegiate conferences, and athletic associations 
(e.g. the NCAA) from penalizing students that accept payment from a third party 
in return for the use of their NILs.33 The Act specifically only allows athletes to 
enter into NIL deals with third parties.34  
The Fair Pay to Play Act addresses a potential loophole by prohibiting the 
NCAA from banning California schools from participation in intercollegiate 
sports as retaliation for athletes at that school choosing to profit from the use of 
their NILs.35  
In the weeks following the passage of the law, lawmakers in at least twelve 
other U.S. states rushed to announce they would be pursuing similar legislation; 
some even introduced similar bills in their state legislatures mere weeks after 
California’s bill unanimously passed.36 Federally, Congressman Mark Walker 
of North Carolina introduced the Student-Athlete Equity Act, a law which 
would amend the tax code, forcing schools to either allow athletes to profit from 
 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. 
 31 S.B. 206, Collegiate Athletics: Student Athlete Compensation and Representation, 
383th Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019). 
 32 Gov. Newsom Signs SB 206, the ‘Fair Pay to Play Act’, SENATOR NANCY SKINNER 
(Sept. 30, 2019), https://sd09.senate.ca.gov/news/20190930-gov-newsom-signs-sb-206-
%E2%80%98fair-pay-play-act%E2%80%99 [https://perma.cc/W387-VWFB]. 
 33 S.B. 206 § 2(c)–(d). 
 34 S.B. 206 § 2(b). 
 35 S.B. 206 § 2(a)(3). 
 36 Jon Wilner, Hotline Newsletter: Washington and Colorado (and Others) Move to 
NIL Compensation, Larry Scott As You Haven’t Heard Him, and More, THE MERCURY NEWS 
(Oct. 4, 2019), https://www.mercurynews.com/2019/10/04/hotline-newsletter-washington-
and-colorado-and-others-move-to-nil-compensation-larry-scott-as-you-havent-heard-him-
and-more/ [https://perma.cc/PRA4-4SJ4].  
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third-party endorsement deals, or lose their non-profit tax exemptions.37 
Additionally, Congressman Anthony Gonzalez, a United States Representative 
and former wide receiver for The Ohio State University and the Indianapolis 
Colts, announced his own version of a bill allowing athletes to profit from the 
use of their NILs.38  
D. The NCAA and the Fair Pay to Play Act: Reaction, Reversal, and 
Hidden Motives 
NCAA officials quickly opposed the California Act, stating that it would 
eliminate the distinction between college and professional sports, and the 
organization released statements claiming that the law is unconstitutional.39 
Despite the California law’s prohibition on athletic associations banning schools 
from play in response to athletes profiting from the use of their likeness, that is 
precisely what the NCAA initially threatened to do.40  
However, less than two months after the organization’s vehement public 
opposition to California’s law, the NCAA doubled back on this position, 
announcing that it would amend its own rules to allow college athletes to be 
compensated for the use of their NILs.41 Specifically, the NCAA Board of 
Governors announced in vague wording that it would be asking each of its three 
divisions to create rules by January 2021 to ensure that college athletes get a 
share of revenue stemming from the sale of their NILs.42 Following this 
announcement, the nationwide movement to pass legislation allowing athletes 
to profit from the use of their NILs seemed to stall, especially in media 
coverage.43 
 
 37 Jenna West, Congressman Anthony Gonzalez to Propose Federal Fair Pay to Play 
Act, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 2, 2019), https://www.si.com/college/2019/10/02/anthony-
gonzalez-federal-bill-pay-college-athletes [https://perma.cc/V9MG-LWTE]. 
 38 Id. 
 39 NCAA Responds to California Senate Bill 206, NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC 
ASSOCIATION (Sept. 11, 2019); Bumbaca, supra note 12. 
 40 See, e.g., Marc Edelman, NCAA’s Threat to Ban California Member Colleges Could 




 41 Steve Almasy, supra note 13. 
 42 Ganesh Setty and Jabri Young, The NCAA Will Allow Athletes to Profit from Their 
Name, Image, and Likeness in Major Shift for the Organization, CNBC SPORTS (Oct. 29, 
2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/29/ncaa-allows-athletes-to-be-compensated-for-
names-images.html.  
 43 Steve Berkowitz, Florida Legislators Send College-Athlete Name, Image, and 
Likeness Bill to Governor, USA TODAY (Mar. 13, 2020), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2020/03/13/florida-legislators-send-
college-athlete-name-image-bill-governor/5041474002/ [https://perma.cc/4WR2-7B3E]. 
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Many sportswriters and experts in the sports industry are wary about the 
NCAA announcement.44 Skeptics claim that the NCAA merely announced the 
change to stall the momentum of the federal and state governments introducing 
legislation similar to the California law, and experts believe the whole 
announcement by the NCAA is merely “smoke and mirrors.”45 
Jeremy Bloom, two-time Olympic skier and former college football and 
NFL player, released a statement via Twitter in response to the NCAA’s 
announcement: 
[W]e should all be highly skeptical of what their intent is here. For 
example, in today’s press release they say that they support profiting off NIL 
“In a manner that is consistent with the collegiate model.” What in the world 
does that mean? Bottom line, state legislators need to continue down the path 
and keep the pressure high while the NCAA figures out how to hold up their 
house of cards.46  
Representative Walker said the NCAA announcement “offers no insight as 
to how to resolve this . . . . [T]hey have used words in the past to deny equity 
and basic constitutional rights for student-athletes.”47  
Shortly after its announcement, the NCAA published a document 
supporting the view that the organization is not working towards fair 
compensation for athletes.48 It states: “We believe the actions taken by 
California and other states are unconstitutional . . . [t]he NCAA is closely 
monitoring the approaches taken by state governments and the U.S. Congress 
and is considering all potential next steps.”49 The NCAA continues to attack the 
California law, while simultaneously claiming it plans to allow athletes to profit 
from the use of their NILs. If the NCAA plans to allow players to profit from 
the use of their NILs, there would be no need to continue attacking the California 
law.50  
 
 44 See, e.g., Terry Collins, NCAA’s Ruling on College Athletes Getting Paid Is Still 
‘Smoke and Mirrors,’ Experts Say, FORTUNE (Oct. 30, 2019), 
https://fortune.com/2019/10/30/ncaa-decision-college-athletes-pay/ 
[https://perma.cc/KR8M-WX3L].  
 45 Id. Ramogi Huma, the National College Players Association’s executive director, 
stated that the NCAA has no concrete proposals, and its position reflects a “continued state 
of denial.” Id. 
 46 Jeremy Bloom (@JeremyBloom11), TWITTER (Oct. 29, 2019, 8:02 P.M.), 
https://twitter.com/JeremyBloom11/status/1189331792219820039.  
 47 Dennis Dodd, Inside the NCAA’s Move to Allow Athletes to Profit from Name, Image, 
and Likeness Rights, CBS SPORTS (Oct. 29, 2019), https://www.cbssports.com/college-
football/news/inside-the-ncaas-move-to-allow-athletes-to-profit-from-name-image-and-
likeness-rights/ [https://perma.cc/LE2B-ZMFK]. 
 48 Questions and Answers on Name, Image and Likeness, NATIONAL COLLEGIATE 
ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION (last updated 28, 2020), http://www.ncaa.org/questions-and-
answers-name-image-and-likeness [https://perma.cc/SB2R-NRUT]. 
 49 Id. 
 50 The NCAA stated that the reason it still opposes the California law: 
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Approximately four months after the NCAA announced that it would allow 
college athletes to profit from the use of their NILs, NCAA President Mark 
Emmert confirmed the organization’s hidden motive behind its announcement 
when he urged Congress to implement federal restrictions on college athletes’ 
ability to earn money from endorsements.51  
III. CALIFORNIA’S FAIR PAY TO PLAY ACT LIKELY VIOLATES THE 
DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
Before the passage of California’s Fair Pay to Play Act, California State 
Senator Nancy Skinner, a co-sponsor of the bill, reached out to Chris Sagers, an 
antitrust expert and law professor at Cleveland State University, to analyze 
whether the law could withstand a constitutional challenge.52 Professor Sagers 
replied with a six-page analysis concluding that an NCAA challenge to the 
California law would fail and the law would be upheld as constitutional.53  
A. Rebuttal to Professor Sagers’ Letter to Gavin Newsom 
As Sagers points out in his constitutional analysis, “the NCAA’s argument 
appears to be that SB 206 would violate the ‘dormant commerce clause’ of the 
U.S. Constitution.”54 The Supreme Court interprets the federal government’s 
ability to “regulate Commerce . . . among the several States,”55 to mean that the 
power to regulate interstate commerce is reserved to the federal government 
rather than state governments, and those state governments therefore may not 
discriminate or burden an interstate market.56 
 
It is critical that college sports are regulated at a national level. This ensures the uniformity 
of rules and a level playing field for student-athletes. The California law and other proposed 
measures ultimately would lead to pay for play and turn college athletes into employees. 
This directly contradicts the mission of college sports within higher education — that 
student-athletes are students first and choose to play a sport they love against other students 
while earning a degree. 
Id. However, California’s law merely prohibits the NCAA from retaliating against schools 
where athletes exercise their NIL rights. It specifically prohibits colleges, universities, 
conferences, and athletic associations from paying athletes, which the NCAA is listing as its 
main concern.  
 51 NCAA President Mark Emmert Seeks Senate’s Help on Topic of Athlete Pay, ESPN 
(Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/28680672/ncaa-president-
mark-emmert-seeks-senate-help-topic-athlete-pay [https://perma.cc/YY2V-S5RP]. 
 52 Chris Sagers, Letter to Gavin Newsom in Reply to the NCAA: Constitutionality of 
California SB 206, the “Fair Pay to Play Act”, (Sept. 24, 2019), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3460551 [https://perma.cc/JQ73-HRCB]. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 56 For a more complete history of the evolution of the Dormant Commerce Clause in 
American jurisprudence, see Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce 
Clause and the Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569, 574–81 (1987). 
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When evaluating a Dormant Commerce Clause case, the Supreme Court has 
adopted a two-tier test.57 First, if a state statute directly regulates or 
discriminates against interstate commerce, or if its effect favors in-state 
economic interests over out-of-state interests, federal courts will strike down the 
statute without further inquiry.58 Second, if a statute only indirectly affects 
interstate commerce and regulates in a geographically neutral manner, then 
federal courts will weigh whether the state’s interest is legitimate and whether 
the burden on interstate commerce outweighs the local benefits in what has 
become known as the Pike balancing test.59 
1. California’s Fair Pay to Play Act May Directly Discriminate Against 
Out-of-State Schools 
Professor Sagers begins his analysis of California’s law by stating that the 
proposed S.B. 206 “does not ‘inject[] . . . [its] regulatory scheme into the 
jurisdiction of other states’” and also “does not discriminate against any 
commerce in any way.”60 Through this reasoning, he quickly dismisses the 
argument that the California law could violate the first prong of the test. 
However, the analysis under the first prong should not be dismissed so 
hastily. While Sagers takes it as a given that “[t]he NCAA will be just as free to 
restrict compensation outside California as it was before adoption of 
S.B. 206,”61 this does not hold true in the context of interstate athletic 
competition. If athletes from California teams choose to exercise their right to 
profit from the use of their NILs through an endorsement deal, then the 
California law would force schools, conferences, and athletic associations in 
other states to recognize the rights of those players to participate in athletic 
events in their state, despite the prohibitive rules in that state.62 
This argument ultimately would be determined by what frame of reference 
a trial judge decides to view the California law under—either preventing 
retaliatory action by schools in California or forcing out-of-state schools to 
accept and play against California schools with major recruiting advantages. A 
trial judge could reasonably interpret the California law as directly forcing the 
 
 57 Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 
(1986). 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. See also Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).  
 60 Sagers, supra note 52, at 4. 
 61 Id. at 3–4. 
 62 For instance, if athletes for the University of Southern California chose to enter into 
major endorsement deals, some players could potentially be making hundreds of thousands 
of dollars per year from these deals. See supra Part II.B. The California law would then 
require schools in other states to allow USC’s team to compete there. Conference rules 
require many schools outside California to schedule games against California schools. 
Michael Felder, How Is a College Football Schedule Made?, BLEACHER REPORT (Sept. 27, 
2012), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/1350023-how-is-a-college-football-schedule-
made [https://perma.cc/Y9QJ-4EJQ]. 
2020] OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL ONLINE 263 
will of the state legislature on schools outside of California by forcing them to 
accept and play against athletes that are in violation of the rules of their state. 
The court would then be required to find this as direct discrimination against 
schools in other states and strike down the law for violating the first prong of 
the Dormant Commerce Clause test.63 
2. Even if a Court Finds No Direct Discrimination Against Interstate 
Commerce in the California Law, the Law Will Still Likely Fail the Pike 
Balancing Test 
Even if a court finds that the California law does not directly discriminate 
against interstate commerce, the law will still need to survive the second prong 
of the Dormant Commerce Clause test: the Pike balancing test. Professor Sagers 
begins his analysis under this test by stating that the burdens the California law 
places on other states in the collegiate sports market will be “[f]or the most 
part . . . small and incremental.”64  
However, the dollar amounts that certain players would be able to make 
through marketing their NILs to third parties could be in the hundreds of 
thousands, and potentially into the millions each year for the most decorated 
players in college sports.65 When large sums of money would be available to 
top athletes in California, but not in other states, it would be unlikely that the 
top athletes in the country decide to attend school somewhere besides 
California.66 
Professor Sagers’ analysis attempts to rationalize the potential recruiting 
advantage by pointing to current inconsistencies in scholarships and grants 
between conferences and schools.67 The problem here is that those restrictions 
are typically self-imposed by the school or conference,68 and are quite small. 
 
 63 See Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 579. 
 64 Sagers, supra note 52, at 4. The crux of Professor Sagers’ analysis seems to be that 
the majority of athletes in California under this legislation will make such a small sum of 
money by marketing their NILs that the actual burden will be quite small, and therefore not 
enough to overcome California’s interest in protecting athletes.  
 65 See supra Part II.B. 
 66 While only a minority of athletes—the top 5%—could negotiate meaningful 
endorsement deals, the effect of the top 5% of talent concentrating in one state cannot be 
characterized as “small and incremental,” as Sagers claims. 
 67 For instance, Ivy league schools do not offer athletic scholarships, but still can 
compete against schools that do. Sagers, supra note 52, at 4. Similarly, under conference and 
sub-national organization rules, athletes at some schools may only be entitled to a maximum 
scholarship of tuition and room and board, while other schools may be permitted to distribute 
the same amount plus cost of living stipends, but the NCAA allows competition between 
said schools. Id. 
 68 Conferences and schools may lift their self-imposed restrictions at any time to place 
themselves on an even playing field with other schools, and schools may leave a conference 
with restrictions if they so choose. With the competitive boost that California schools will 
gain under the new law, out-of-state schools would be unable to equalize their position due 
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Under California’s new law, however, a California quarterback could be on a 
full scholarship and also marketing their NILs, while an opposing team’s 
quarterback may have a maximum total grant package that is a mere fraction of 
that.69 Professor Sagers next argues that higher education and employment are 
traditionally areas where state governments are given wide discretionary 
authority,70 but there is no such tradition of state regulation of the inner 
workings of college athletics specifically, and courts have routinely 
differentiated college athletes from employees.71 
Professor Sagers also notes that the Supreme Court has permitted state 
antitrust laws to go beyond federal protections.72 However, courts may be wary 
to apply these protections to the college sports industry, for similar reasons to 
why courts routinely differentiate college athletes from employees. Due to the 
small number of top recruits in each sport every year and the direct competition 
between schools, recruiting athletes can have a much larger impact on 
competition between teams than recruiting employees can on competition 
between businesses. Furthermore, a business that disagrees with a state antitrust 
law may simply move to another state to regain its maximum rights under 
federal law, while moving states is an impossibility for colleges and universities. 
If the Court finds that California’s law indirectly discriminates against other 
states in interstate commerce, the burden shifts to California to demonstrate an 
overriding state interest.73 Federal courts are reluctant to defer to the judgement 
of states who argue that a state interest overrides interstate commerce.74 
California may attempt to justify its law with the history of NCAA 
exploitation of college athletes. However, federal courts have been hesitant to 
legitimize this concern in antitrust cases brought by college athletes, and instead 
have deferred to the NCAA on matters of athlete compensation.75 
B. In a Dormant Commerce Clause Challenge, California’s Fair Pay to 
Play Act Will Most Likely Be Struck Down as Unconstitutional 
Ultimately, there is no denying just how large of a market college sports are, 
and it would be difficult to argue that elite athletes could not see large profits 
from the California bill.76 The substance of the NCAA’s argument is certainly 
 
to NCAA restrictions, absent lobbying their respective state governments to pass similar 
legislation. 
 69 See supra Part II.B. 
 70 See Sagers, supra note 52, at 4–5. 
 71 See supra note 17. 
 72 Sagers, supra note 52, at 5–6. 
 73 See Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 671–74 (1981). 
 74 See id. at 675–76.  
 75 See, e.g., O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1066 (2015) (“the labor of student-
athletes is an integral and essential component of the NCAA’s ‘product,’ and a rule setting 
the price of that labor goes to the heart of the NCAA’s business”). 
 76 See supra Part II.B. 
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not “weak,” as Professor Sagers argues. In fact, a court analyzing the California 
law under the Dormant Commerce Clause would likely find the law 
unconstitutional because it impermissibly burdens interstate commerce, either 
directly or through a Pike balancing analysis. 
IV. CONGRESS SHOULD PASS LEGISLATION ALLOWING ATHLETES TO 
PROFIT FROM THE USE OF THEIR NILS TO PROTECT ATHLETES  
Federal action is required to ensure athletes continue to be protected from 
the exploitative practices of the NCAA, as state protections like California’s 
Fair Pay to Play Act are likely unconstitutional.77 Currently, the best way to 
protect athletes would be federal legislation allowing them to enter into 
sponsorships and similar arrangements with third parties, enabling them to profit 
from the use of their NILs.  
A federal law similar to California’s should not be unconstitutional, as the 
Dormant Commerce Clause appears to be the only grounds on which the NCAA 
could possibly challenge the California law.78 Having one set of fixed laws that 
every college and university must abide by will invalidate one of the most-cited 
criticisms of the California law: the competitive edge that it gives to California 
schools in recruiting athletes.79  
V. CONCLUSION 
After analyzing the merits of both the NCAA and State of California’s 
arguments regarding personal payment for athlete NIL use, a federal court 
would most likely side with the NCAA and find the California law 
unconstitutional. As a result, the time is now for Congress to step in and pass 
legislation to protect athletes nationwide and ensure that the NCAA does not 
“sweep the issue under the rug.” 
 
 77 See supra Part III.B. 
 78 See supra notes 54–56 and accompanying text. 
 79 See, e.g., Questions and Answers, supra note 48 (“It is critical that college sports are 
regulated at a national level. This ensures the uniformity of rules and a level playing field 
for student-athletes.”). 
